Until the beginning of this year, the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic and all events related to this unrecognized republic seemed to have disappeared from the media’s field of view.

This situation changed dramatically at the beginning of 2025, when the forecast assessment of the further development of the conflict in this region became more relevant and actively discussed than ever.

A potential possible assessment of the development of the situation in the Transnistrian region in the first half of 2025 is described in the forecast “Transnistria with an exit to the nearest events of a larger scale”, published on January 5 of this year in Svetlana Dragan’s appendix.

Let us analyze this forecast in the context of overcoming the energy crisis in Transnistria, which is largely related to the further development of the conflict between the Republic of Moldova (hereinafter referred to as RM, Moldova, Moldova) and the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (hereinafter referred to as PMR, Transnistria).

There is no doubt about the main conclusion that was made in the forecast as a whole:

Svetlana Dragan: “… the region itself may still remain as if between two fires. And the situation for Transnistria remains extremely tense…”

In confirmation of the above, let us recall a little history and reasons for the current situation.

At the heart of this conflict is the desire of Moldova, which received statehood “as a gift for the first time in its history” after the collapse of the USSR, to annex Transnistria by any means necessary and then become part of Romania. At the same time, the pro-Russian population of the unrecognized republic, the majority of whom are Russian citizens, wants to become part of the Russian Federation.

At the same time, the Moldovan leadership, with the support of the West, uses all possible measures of both force and non-force nature. Recently, priority has been given to measures of financial and economic pressure.

They became especially aggravated at the beginning of the current [2025] year. The critical situation with energy supply, which led to a sharp increase in internal tension in and around Transnistria, developed after the leadership of Ukraine made a political decision (dictated primarily by its Western curators) to stop the transportation of Russian gas to Europe through its territory from January 1, 2025.
The formal reason for this was the termination of the gas transportation contract, and the real reason was the attempts of the United States and its Western European allies to continue to push Russia out of the gas market in Europe. In addition, a negative factor with the supply of Russian gas was Moldova’s refusal to pay for the Russian gas previously supplied to them, worth 709 million dollars.

Not the least of the reasons for this decision by Moldova and Ukraine in early 2025 was the desire to create serious difficulties for Russia in providing energy resources to Transnistria, on whose territory a significant number of Russian citizens live, a Russian peacekeeping contingent operates, and Russian military personnel continue to carry out their tasks, guarding significant in terms of their volume, military warehouses left over from the Soviet era.

In the first weeks of January, Chisinau began to more sharply declare that it was not going to “support this unconstitutional regime (Transnistria)” and was trying to force it to exist without Russian assistance.

All this confirms Moldova’s general line on creating instability in Transnistria, which will subsequently ensure its annexation to Moldova. These ideas are also supported by Ukraine, which dreams of seizing ammunition and military-technical reserves of the military base left in Transnistria from the Soviet era. In the context of the planned sharp reduction in military assistance from the United States, this is considered one of the options for providing the Armed Forces of Ukraine with the means to continue the war.

All this confirms the predictions of S. Dragan that the situation in Transnistria in the first months of 2025 “… will sharply worsen and the region will find itself between two hostile states” dreaming of the fall of the unrecognized republic.

And although the main events related to the resolution of the interstate conflict as a whole are still ahead, some of them, primarily related to the energy crisis related to the events of January-early March 2025, can already be discussed.
Here are just a few of them.

Svetlana Dragan: “… On January 14, Russia will try to take some actions (in relation to Transnistria) … this may look like an operation to save the region…”

It was on this day (January 14) that the President of Transnistria held talks in Moscow at the Russian Ministry of Energy on overcoming the energy crisis (see link below). Details of the technical aspects were not provided at that time, as they are related to the difficulties of interstate coordination with various European structures, taking into account numerous sanctions restrictions. But the head of the republic noted that gas supply for the needs of Transnistrians and the functioning of the economy will be restored in the format of Russian humanitarian and technical assistance.

But then the question arises: will solutions to the problems that have arisen be found immediately?

First of all, this concerned the need for significant gas supplies necessary to ensure the operation of the Moldavian State District Power Plant, which is located on the territory of Transnistria and provides electricity to both the right and left banks of the Dniester.

This power plant belongs to Transnistria, but is a “tasty morsel” for Moldova and, thus, has long been a stumbling block between the RM and the PMR. When taking office as President of Moldova at the end of 2024, the pro-Romanian Maia Sandu even expressed her desire to seize the power plant by force, which could inevitably lead to a military conflict. It would not be superfluous to note that Ukraine expressed its readiness to provide assistance (and in fact, a “disservice”) to Moldova in this action.
Taking advantage of the difficult energy situation, that is, economic problems, Moldovan President Maia Sandu in January 2025 changes her plans regarding the Moldavian State District Power Plant, which she had previously proposed to seize by military means, as Svetlana Dragan notes:

Svetlana Dragan: “… but on 17.01.2025, Maia Sandu seems to close the topic of war, in the sense that we will see the result of her aspirations and actions…”

During this period, she [Maia Sandu] has one aspiration – to dictate her financial and economic conditions, blackmailing Transnistria by refusing to help, and in fact – by blocking gas supply routes and financial dictate, until the Russian peacekeeping contingent is withdrawn and replaced by UN observers.

As proof of this, on the EADaily website on January 17, in the article “Chisinau will not work with MoldGRES: there is no energy stability in Transnistria,” it is stated that Moldova will not purchase electricity from Transnistria. At the same time, S. Dragan’s forecast confirms these events and the previously indicated actions of the Moldovan leadership regarding electricity purchases:

Svetlana Dragan: “… by January 16-17, 2025, the situation regarding this power plant will play out…”

The resolution of the energy crisis dragged on for almost the entire month of January and February.

Svetlana Dragan emphasizes: “… Russia will be holding negotiations by January 26, but so far they will not lead to anything constructive…”.

It was on January 25, in contrast to Russian aspirations, that a meeting of the Presidents of Moldova and Ukraine took place, where they discussed how to prevent Russia from helping, and actually push it out of the region, while offering absolutely unrealistic plans for resolving the energy crisis for Tiraspol.
On the website Eurasia.Expert on January 27, in the article “Chisinau called on Transnistria to refuse aid from the Russian Federation” and in the RT article in Russian on January 27, “Ukrainian coal instead of Russian gas. Chisinau gave an ultimatum to Transnistria – what will happen next?”, Moldova’s “ultimatum” to Transnistria is noted, which consists of an attempt to resolve the energy crisis without the “Russian factor”.

The article emphasizes that Moldova is playing a political game against the unrecognized region, deliberately prolonging the crisis, seeking to stir up anti-Russian sentiments in the region. While the options proposed by Chisinau are absolutely unacceptable and do not correspond to the wishes, capabilities and needs of Tiraspol, and cannot be practically implemented.

Thus, Ukraine expresses its readiness to provide specialists for the conversion of the state district power plant to use its coal. While this coal from Ukraine does not meet technical requirements. The power units are designed to use anthracite, and not the proposed gas coal. Even for the minimum possible, from a technological point of view, its use, the conversion of one power unit will require more than a year and more than 50 million euros. Which is unrealistic for Transnistria.
On the EADaily website, in an article from January 28, “Grosu: Moldova is giving gas to Transnistria for subsequent reintegration. The Moldovan authorities will not support the “separatist regime of the Transnistrian region”,” it is indicated that the speaker of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, Igor Grosu, commented on the EU’s decision taken the day before to provide a loan of 3 million cubic meters of gas to maintain critical pressure in the pipelines. But this decision was considered by the Moldovan government, first of all, in the interests of right-bank Moldova, which was left without cheap electricity from the Moldovan State District Power Plant.

Before this, Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean announced that in addition to gas, the European Union would allocate a grant of 30 million euros for the purchase of gas through Energocom. At the same time, Tiraspoltransgaz must undertake to pay for gas at European market prices, which are constantly changing upwards, or return this gas.

And even these enslaving conditions were not formalized in the form of contracts in a timely manner. Let us recall that, in fact, Moldova had not concluded contracts with intermediaries for the supply of these volumes of gas by the end of January, dragging out this process in every possible way, introducing confusion and organizational chaos into it. The decision on the obligations to generate electricity for both banks was not agreed upon with Tiraspol. After all, the gas planned for supply would not be enough for the GRES to generate the previous volume of electricity.
In confirmation of the above, on the website of the Neftegaz magazine in the article by E. Alifirova “Viscous swamp. Humanitarian gas supplies to Transnistria are still blocked” it is indicated that this issue has not been resolved even as of January 30, 2025. And the situation is becoming critical, since there could only be enough gas until February 1, even to maintain the required pressure in the gas pipelines.

In view of the uncertainty of the situation, the threat of growing discontent among the population of Transnistria with the approaching humanitarian catastrophe, S. Dragan did not rule out:

Svetlana Dragan: “… that the President of Transnistria Vadim Krasnoselsky himself may be … under attack by 30.01.2025.”

Moldova then announced that all loans from the EU were intended for them, but not for gas supplies to Transnistria. The solution to the problem was no longer a matter of days, but of hours.

And only Vadim Krasnoselsky’s personal appeal to the EU allowed the problem to be temporarily solved. Gas began to flow to Transnistria on February 1. But it had to be paid for by March 1. Gas supplies were carried out under short-term contracts.

Svetlana Dragan’s forecast also considered further events around Transnistria: “… the situation is not resolved instantly for anyone in this game…”.
On the VEDOMOSTI website on February 11, in the article “Moldova has put forward political conditions for gas supplies to Transnistria,” it was indicated that as of February 11, the situation, as noted by S. Dragan, had not found its further resolution.

The author of the article notes that Chisinau wanted to force Tiraspol to accept the terms of the European grant for gas supplies through Romanian intermediaries, which would lead to an increase in energy prices by 4 times, and gas prices by 16 times. This would mean the collapse of the industry of Transnistria, a socio-political crisis, and a mass exodus of the population from the region.

In addition, Chisinau demanded that Transnistria fulfill a number of political demands: the release of political prisoners, a solution to the problem with the Romanian-language lyceum in Rybnitsa, keeping the Moldova 1 TV channel on the broadcasting grid, and dismantling the checkpoint on the administrative border.

In turn, Transnistria, having actually fulfilled the political conditions, insisted on gas supplies to the unrecognized republic by a Hungarian company with the participation of Moldovagaz for a Russian loan. This was beneficial for Transnistria, since it maintained preferential prices (albeit higher, compared to December, due to the change in transportation routes).
On February 13, in the article “Hungarian gas has not arrived in Transnistria”, the EADaily website noted that the gas was being purchased on the Romanian exchange, instead of being supplied from February 11, 2025 by the Hungarian company, as specified in the concluded contract. The main problem was that the Hungarian company could not agree with Ukraine on pumping European gas to the Republic of Moldova through its territory. The issue had been hanging for three days. Tiraspol suffered losses from higher prices. And only on February 14 was the problem temporarily resolved.

On the website Rhythm of Eurasia, in an article dated February 24, “Transnistria is trying to get out of the energy crisis with Russia’s help,” it is noted that gas purchased from Hungary began to arrive in Transnistria only on February 14, 2025. with the support of Russia. But the leadership of Transnistria notes that the solutions found to date (as of February 24) are temporary.

As stated in S. Dragan’s forecast: “… the issue has been hanging until March and cannot be finally resolved”.

This is confirmed by the fact that contracts with the Hungarian company were concluded from February 14 for two weeks, i.e. until the end of February, and the solution to all problems of long-term gas supplies should be implemented in March.
Moreover, despite Russian preferential loans, the cost of gas has still increased due to the changed transportation conditions. As noted on February 25 on the Interfax website in the article “Energy tariffs in Transnistria have been sharply increased due to changes in the gas supply scheme” from March 1, according to preliminary estimates, the gas tariff will increase by 2 times, heating by 1.8 times, and electricity will become 1.5 times more expensive.

And only in fact in the last days of February, namely on February 27, Vadim Krasnoselsky confirmed that the gas supply mechanism will continue to operate in March.

As S. Dragan indicated, Russia plays a decisive role in this matter, which was confirmed by the President of the PMR, expressing “… gratitude to the Russian side – officials and staff of the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation for … systematic work to prevent … a humanitarian catastrophe,” which was stated on the EADaily website on February 27 in the article “Krasnoselsky: the issue of gas supplies to Transnistria for the next period has been resolved.”

In the first days of March, Transnistria returned 3 million cubic meters of gas borrowed from Moldovagaz and began to receive gas for its needs stably through Hungarian intermediaries at the expense of Russian loans.

In general, the crisis situation regarding the resolution of energy problems developed in accordance with the key dates that were indicated by S. Dragan in her forecast.