Israel as an apple of discord. Summer 2026

Forecast: “Global world events in the coming months” (published March 18, 2026, link)

S. Dragan:

Israel is under colossal crosshairs; it will be on the verge of destruction or serious damage on March 20–26, 2026. But apparently, that is not all, because this country, like an apple of discord or the center of a “field disturbance,” has not yet played the main role in all the events that will continue in July–August 2026, where one of the hottest historical flashpoints of the present time is located…

In a number of Confirmations dated May 2, June 5, June 10, and July 30, it is noted that “…Israel was under colossal crosshairs; it would be on the verge of … serious damage on March 20–26, 2026…” “But apparently, that is not all…” In April, Israel had enough political cunning to “withdraw” from active confrontation with Iran, leaving the United States and its Arab allies to exchange missile strikes with Iran.

But, as the events of late summer showed, “…apparently, that is not all, because this country, like an apple of discord or the center of a ‘field disturbance,’ has not yet played the main role in all the events.”

Dangerous signs are once again emerging in Israel’s security system, reminiscent of the situation before the October 7 attack (in 2023 — InoSMI editor’s note). These include Hamas rebuilding its capabilities, testing IDF defenses, and servicemen’s fear of openly reporting problems to their commanders.

At the end of August 2026, in a new report by the October Council, the authors of the document identified seven alarming signals that, in their view, require immediate attention from Israel’s military and political leadership.

One of the most serious problems cited is the so-called “barrier of fear.” While preparing the report, soldiers, reservists, commanders, and security agency personnel repeatedly asked for their names not to be disclosed. Some feared career consequences, pressure from management, or other sanctions.

A former senior official in one of the security agencies claims that critical remarks and warnings are freely discussed outside official meetings, but people become considerably more cautious directly in front of leadership. As a result, important information may not receive proper attention.

A separate warning concerns the situation in the Gaza Strip. According to the report, despite the losses it has sustained, Hamas continues to rebuild its capabilities, recruit new fighters, manufacture weapons, and repair infrastructure.

Particular concern is raised by the situation near the new defense line. The document cites testimony from servicemen and observers about Palestinians and Hamas fighters approaching IDF positions, crossing the established line, and attempting to determine the speed of the Israeli military’s response. In one August IDF report, 14 violations were recorded in a single day, 11 of which were assessed as a potential threat to the troops.

The authors also cite a shortage of personnel as another problem. Reservists report a reduction in available forces and a growing burden on units responsible for protecting border communities. In the event of several simultaneous attacks, resources for a rapid response may prove insufficient.

The families of those killed on October 7, 2023, urged the military not to ignore even seemingly minor changes near the border. The return of kites, suspicious activity near defense lines, and attempts to test the IDF’s response must not once again be regarded as the new normal, in their view.

The report also addresses threats on other fronts. Its authors point out that Hezbollah retains its weaponry, while Iran remains Israel’s strategic adversary. The simultaneous expansion of tasks amid limited human resources could further increase the burden on the security system.

Separate criticism concerns the investigation into the causes of the October 7, 2023 failure. The IDF, Shin Bet, and other bodies are conducting their own inquiries, but the document’s authors consider this insufficient. In their view, Israel needs an independent state commission capable of examining the entire chain of decisions—from intelligence and the military to the political leadership.

Israel’s media campaign against Iran contradicts the actual state of affairs in the IDF, Mashregh wrote on August 3, 2026. According to internal reports and statements by the General Staff, the country is facing a personnel shortage, depleted air defense missiles, and a severe economic crisis.

Israel Defense Forces Chief of the General Staff Eyal Zamir stated on August 27, 2026, that the country’s Defense Forces (IDF) were facing a problem of insufficient funding. According to him, the current budget situation is harming the combat readiness of units.

“Unfortunately, these days we are facing a problem concerning the IDF budget. At a time when the IDF is operating on all fronts, we have to cope with a shortage of funds. Such a situation harms combat readiness,” the army press service quoted Zamir as saying on its Telegram channel.

Israeli citizens have recently been under constant psychological pressure related to expectations of renewed active hostilities and missile strikes.

On September 4, 2026, citing sources, the Maariv publication reported that Iran was preparing for a large-scale attack on Israel. According to its information, Tehran would like to catch its regional adversary off guard and simultaneously deploy all allied forces in the Middle East—Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Ansar Allah movement in Yemen, and numerous Shiite groups in Iraq. The escalation could have occurred during the celebration of Rosh Hashanah—the Jewish New Year—which this year falls on September 11–13, according to Israeli assessments.

The version that an attack was being prepared during these days was confirmed by Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz. “They (Iran and its allies. — ‘Kommersant’) like to attack on Jewish holidays because they hate Jews,” the head of the defense ministry noted while speaking on September 2, 2026, at a conference organized by the Yedioth Ahronoth publication. “Look at a series of events that happened in the past. But we are ready for both defense and attack.” He warned that Israel would respond to its regional adversary “with tremendous force” and that its “planes are ready to take off.”

Speaking on September 3, 2026, before the leadership of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) at a pre-New Year event, Mr. Katz suggested that Iran’s leadership could be pushed toward escalation by the intensifying U.S. sanctions campaign, “Economic Pariah.” “We see signs that the powerful economic pressure under which Iran finds itself, the fear of an uprising and the collapse of the regime, may push it toward desperate measures,” the head of the defense ministry reasoned.

For Israel, the cornerstone issue of survival is the quantity and quality of its population. But in the past few years, an extremely dangerous trend for the country has emerged—a population outflow.

Between 2023 and 2025, 268,509 Israeli citizens left the country for at least three consecutive months. The annual figures for those leaving for periods of three months or more are as follows:

• 2023: 86,509 people;
• 2024: 91,499 people;
• 2025: 90,922 people.

Researchers estimate that the final number of emigrants who remained abroad for 12 months or more in 2025 likely amounted to between 45,000 and 50,000 people.

Before that, from 2010 to 2019, an average of about 60,000 people left annually, while over the three years from 2013 to 2015, only 183,219 left. Thus, the current outflow is almost 50% higher than it was ten years ago.

The main concern of scholars, primarily Professors Itay Ater and Nittai Bergman, is related not so much to the overall number as to the qualitative composition of those leaving. They note a “brain drain” and the emigration of representatives of professions crucial to the economy.

Among those leaving the country, the share of high-income people has risen sharply—from one-quarter to more than one-third of all those departing—as has the share of specialists in high technology, management, and the liberal professions.

Between January 2023 and September 2024, 875 doctors left the country. The net outflow, taking into account those who returned, totaled 481 doctors.

The net outflow of engineers during the same period amounted to about 2,330 people, while among holders of doctoral degrees (PhDs) in science and technology fields, it was 224 people.

More than 75% of those leaving are under 40, indicating the loss of the most mobile and promising part of the population.

Researchers link this surge in emigration to a combination of factors: a prolonged military conflict, political tensions, and economic difficulties. Many of those leaving tie their decision specifically to dissatisfaction with the political situation and security issues.

As a result, Israel has encountered the rare phenomenon of negative net migration: in 2024 and 2025, nearly 50,000 more people left the country than arrived. This breaks a long-standing historical trend in which the number of arrivals, mainly Jews, exceeded the number of departures.

Although the authors emphasize that the current figures do not yet pose an immediate threat to the country, they warn of long-term risks. If the trend persists, it could seriously damage the economy, scientific and technological potential, and, in the long term, Israel’s security as well.

Evidence of serious foreign policy problems for Tel Aviv was the deterioration of Israel’s relations with Turkey and Britain in the summer of 2026. But this will be discussed in other Confirmations.

To be continued…