On the Restructuring of Russia's Economy from Spring 2022 to Spring 2023 Following the Start of the Special Military Operation
Forecast: Geopolitical astrologer Svetlana Dragan on Russia's future for the “FAMETIME TV” channel (published April 16, 2022).
S. Dragan:
And I think that there (from spring 2022 to spring 2023), at least this part of the tension (in the economy) is already easing. … There are somewhat different circumstances there…
… Russia is changing, … its positioning is changing … by 2023 …
Assessment as of February 2023, One Year into the Special Military Operation
State of the Economy
Russia's GDP declined by 2.1% in 2022, which is incomparable with the pessimistic expectations of last spring. Household spending fell by 1.8% in constant prices, while investment in fixed capital increased by 5.2% (the latter also includes spending on the production of weapons systems).
The factors that made it possible to avoid a large-scale decline were the expansion of parallel imports, high oil prices, the government's anti-crisis measures, the actual continuation of operations by many companies that had left, as well as increased output in the military-industrial complex, Dmitry Skrypnik, a leading researcher at the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, told RBC. “Even more important is that production capacity was utilized as a result of the forced creation of production chains relying on domestic manufacturers,” the expert emphasized. According to surveys by the Gaidar Institute, capacity utilization in Russia reached its highest level since the early 1990s—78.5% in October—which was even higher than the utilization rate before the start of the special operation and the imposition of harsh sanctions, he added.
The state apparatus, taught by the COVID pandemic, acted promptly to support business and the economy, believes Anton Sviridenko, director of the Stolypin Institute for Economic Growth. “What had previously gone for export began to find its place in Russia. In addition, it became clear that regular trade could use neither dollars nor euros, even effectively switching to barter,” the expert noted. According to him, the establishment of new logistics also proved effective: “There are problems in the eastern direction, but the southern corridor was a surprise, through which it proved possible to ensure supplies of critical imports.”
In 2023, the economy may return to growth by year-end, according to the forecast of the International Monetary Fund and the expectations of the government and the Bank of Russia. But there are risks as well. The embargo on Russian exports, including oil, and legal imports, as well as counter-sanctions measures at the end of 2022, led to a sharp reduction in the trade balance surplus, noted Anton Tabakh, managing director for macroeconomic analysis and forecasting at Expert RA. Added to this is the threat of secondary sanctions against countries that are sources of parallel imports of equipment and investment goods into Russia, Skrypnik added.
Real Incomes of Citizens
By the end of 2022, the real disposable income of the Russian population had decreased by 1%, which can be considered a relative success even compared with the Ministry of Economic Development's September forecast of minus 2.2%. However, over the past nine years, since 2014, from which Rosstat has kept these statistics under the new methodology, there were only three nonconsecutive years in which real incomes grew. The task of ensuring sustainable income growth for Russians remains out of reach for now. In mid-February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed officials to achieve growth in real disposable income of at least 2.5% in 2022.
In 2023, real disposable income will probably increase. In the fourth quarter of 2022, incomes had already risen by 0.9% compared with the same period in 2021. Income will be supported by the indexation of social transfers and the growing labor shortage. Competition for workers is leading to higher wages, Central Bank analysts noted. Nevertheless, says Yevsey Gurvich, head of the Economic Expert Group, forced import substitution increases production volumes but reduces citizens' well-being, since many domestic products are not equivalent replacements for departed brands.
Industrial Production
The industrial production index also showed negative momentum in 2022, although it turned out to be better than previous expectations. Industrial output declined by 0.6% for the year—the Ministry of Economic Development had expected a 1.8% decline. The most significant negative contributions to the overall industrial index came from the automotive industry and export-oriented sectors—chemical production and the timber industry.
The oil and gas sector and the production of fabricated metal products made the largest positive contributions to the index's performance. The latter was due in part to an increase in the state defense order amid the military operation in Ukraine: fabricated metal products include weapons and ammunition.
In 2023, the delayed effect of sanctions may become apparent: scheduled maintenance and license renewals will be needed, and difficulties will inevitably arise with this, Sviridenko believes. “The degree to which enterprises can function will depend on how quickly technologies and equipment are actually replaced,” he says.
Budget
After the 2022 budget deficit of 3.3 trillion rubles, or 2.2% of GDP, the gap between revenues and expenditures in 2023 may be even larger, economists warn. Tabakh expects the deficit to amount to 4.5–5 trillion rubles “even in the absence of new shocks,” while Dmitry Polevoy, investment director at Loko-Invest, forecasts a deficit of 4.1–4.5 trillion rubles, compared with the 2.9 trillion rubles planned in the budget law. Polevoy points out that there is no need to “paint too grim a picture”: the budget situation will be worse than planned, but will not be critical. To curb the deficit, the authorities are also discussing a one-time levy on businesses totaling 300 billion rubles.
Analysts' deficit forecasts worsened after the Finance Ministry's January report on budget execution, which showed a 35% reduction in revenues and a 59% increase in expenditures compared with January 2022. But while the shortfall in revenue was partly technical—the amounts of VAT refunds had been shifted to the first month of the quarter—the increase in expenditures was a surprise that has not been fully clarified: since spring 2022, the Finance Ministry has stopped disclosing expenditures in any detail. The ministry only drew attention to a more than fivefold increase in public procurement spending—to 1.3 trillion rubles. As of February 20, the budget had spent 5.1 trillion rubles, or 17.3% of the annual plan.
In 2022, in addition to borrowing, more than 2 trillion rubles from the National Welfare Fund (NWF) had to be spent to cover the budget deficit. At the beginning of 2022, it had just over 6 trillion rubles in available funds remaining: yuan, gold, and euros in accounts at the Bank of Russia. The Finance Ministry is now selling yuan from the NWF due to a shortfall in oil and gas revenues, and the government has already developed a mechanism to increase levies on oil companies: by limiting the discount of Russian oil to Brent and making certain other adjustments, an additional 600 billion rubles will be collected from the oil sector in 2023. As a result, sales from the NWF to cover the budget deficit are expected to cease in the second half of the year, estimates Alexander Isakov, chief Russia economist at Bloomberg Economics.
According to Isakov, the government will effectively have no problems with sources of financing for the deficit; the only real constraint to consider is inflation. Higher spending creates an inflationary risk, Alfa-Bank's macroeconomic analysis center wrote on February 9.
Balance of Payments and Foreign Trade
In 2022, Russia's balance of payments surplus set a record at $227 billion, 86% higher than in 2021, according to the Central Bank's estimate. This was a direct consequence of the sanctions imposed against Russia, which, on the one hand, reduced imports into the country and, on the other, led to a sharp rise in the prices of oil and petroleum products in the first half of the year and, accordingly, an increase in the value of exports. The blocking of Russians' foreign securities in Euroclear also played a role, as did the ban on residents of unfriendly countries withdrawing their investments and income from Russia, introduced in response to the freezing of the country's international reserves.
At the same time, Russia managed to effectively redirect crude oil exports from Europe and the United States to Asian countries—primarily India, China, and Turkey. As for imports, they recovered actively from the summer of 2022, while countries such as Turkey, Armenia, and Kazakhstan, judging by indirect data, re-exported some Western goods to Russia that had ceased to be supplied directly to the country due to sanctions restrictions or voluntary refusals by foreign suppliers.
It is mistaken to view the enormous current account surplus as a factor of economic strength, Isakov emphasizes: the question should be how Russia can use this accumulated surplus, which in practice sits in accounts at foreign banks. In 2023, the trade balance will certainly be lower than in 2022, says Sviridenko. “The surplus will be generated mainly with China, India, and Turkey. And this surplus will most likely be in national currencies. At the same time, imports will also have to be procured from these countries for prompt supply,” he reasons. But Russia currently does not purchase such a large quantity of goods from these countries. Balancing currency and trade flows is a difficult task, the expert concludes.
Overall, sanctions, counter-sanctions, and boycotts by a number of Western suppliers have already led to a fundamental restructuring of Russian foreign trade. According to estimates by the Ministry of Economic Development, the share of unfriendly countries in Russia's merchandise exports by value decreased to 35%, compared with 58% at the beginning of 2022, while their share in Russia's total trade turnover—exports plus imports—fell by 10 percentage points to 45%. Direct exports from the United States to Russia, excluding supplies of American goods from third countries, decreased 3.7-fold in 2022—from $6.4 billion to $1.7 billion, according to U.S. statistics. Direct exports from the European Union to Russia declined 1.6-fold—from €89.2 billion to €55.2 billion. Against this backdrop, China became Russia's main supplier of goods: its share of Russian imports, according to Renaissance Capital estimates, rose from 25% to 34%. According to Chinese customs data, supplies to Russia grew by 12.8% in 2022, to $76.1 billion.
To be continued…